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Criminal justice reform efforts sometimes seem improvisational. 
Scholars and activists have built a persuasive case that we need to 
reform the criminal justice system to reduce our reflexive dependency on 
mass incarceration and to root out bias against the poor, the mentally 
ill, and racial minorities. We know that actions like revising sentencing 
laws and eliminating cash bail are steps in the right direction.  And so 
advocates around the country have been using any tools in grabbing 
distance to achieve those results: legislation, ballot initiatives, 
administrative or judicial regulations, or direct political action. 
Strategic discussion of how to prioritize and harmonize those 
approaches, or how best to build momentum among the states, however, 
is frequently held behind closed doors when it is held at all. 
Opportunistic arguments for reform can sound inconsistent and 
undertheorized.  Reformers sometimes strike populist notes, arguing as 
the occasion demands that legislatures should yield to the will of the 
people when public opinion supports change, that legislatures should 
adopt enlightened policy regardless of public opinion, and that courts 
should invalidate the choices of legislatures. 
This essay will reflect on the toolbox of strategies for criminal 
justice reform, offering examples of recent successes in state legislative 
revision (Louisiana); in a ballot initiative where the state legislature 
rejected reform measures favored by the public (Oklahoma); in state 
and federal courts (challenges to debtors’ prison practices, and 
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continuing litigation to ensure that indigent defendants are represented 
by effective and adequately funded advocates); and in electoral 
campaigns (the recent District Attorney primary race in Philadelphia). 
The essay begins by commenting on the preconditions for 
successful criminal justice reform campaigns, and concludes by 
reconciling arguments for a populist criminal justice system with the 
counter-majoritarian role of the courts. The role the Constitution 
assigns to the people in the application of criminal justice system is to 
check governmental overreaching but not governmental leniency. It 
should be the role of the courts to check irrational or unfair criminal 
justice policy regardless of whether that policy commands popular 
support.  While the federal courts have declined to play that role, state 
courts, not limited by the constraints of federalism, can and should 
become an important part of the solution to our broken criminal justice 
system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It’s easy to say what the ideal American criminal justice system 
should look like. 
It’s a lot more difficult to get there. 
Our ideal system would end our counterproductive addiction to 
mass incarceration, reducing the population of prisons and jails and 
utilizing more, alternative means of addressing addiction, poverty, and 
mental illness. It would address the unfair and disproportionate impact 
of the administration of criminal justice on the poor, on people of color, 
and on the mentally ill. And it would enable people leaving prison to 
successfully reenter society. 
We have some good ideas about particular things to do to begin 
to achieve these goals. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
started a Campaign for Smart Justice in 2010, which aims to reduce the 
prison population by fifty percent through strategies focusing on all 
phases of the criminal justice system. We can control the number of 
people in our prisons and jails by 1) reforming police practices to reduce 
the sheer number of arrests, 2) reforming money bail practices and 
eliminating de facto debtors’ prisons, 3) addressing prosecutorial 
discretion and abuse, 4) eliminating excessive sentences, including 
mandatory minimums, 5) promoting alternatives to incarceration, 6) 
ameliorating unjust or short-sighted parole and probation practices, and 
7) reducing barriers to successful reentry.1 Attentive reforms in each of 
these areas can also help to cut the roots of bias. 
So much has been written about each of these areas2 that rather 
than reiterate why these are the right goals, this essay will address the 
 
1  See Campaign for Smart Justice, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-
incarceration/smart-justice/campaign-smart-justice (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
 2  See generally Marc Mauer & Kate Epstein, To Build a Better Criminal Justice 
System, SENTENCING PROJECT (2012), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/To-Build-a-Better-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf (explaining 
the different barriers to criminal justice reform as well as the benefits of criminal justice 
reform itself); William Galston, Criminal Justice Reform: Issues and Options for Our 
Next President, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/criminal-justice-reform-issues-and-options-for-the-
next-president/ (discussing the many problems in the current criminal justice system, 
such as the cost of incarceration and the overpopulation of prisons, as well as potential 
reform actions the federal government could take). 
  
3
Herman: Strategies for Implementing Criminal Justice Reform
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
ISSUE 23:1 SPRING 2018 
2018 STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 35 
challenging but less frequently discussed question of how best to achieve 
these goals. What are the preconditions for success and how should we 
strategize and prioritize approaches to the various branches of federal, 
state, and local governments? 
My goal here is to reflect on some recent successes and 
strategies, particularly in the areas of sentencing and bail reform. This 
essay focuses on the question of how changes were effectuated and by 
whom: the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of government at the 
federal, state, or local level, or even by the people themselves. 
Part I outlines what seem to be necessary preconditions for 
success: bipartisan cooperation, appropriate attention to state and local 
initiatives, and educational efforts promoting supportive public opinion. 
Part II discusses state efforts to reduce mass incarceration by 
legislative modification of sentencing and other policies, using 
Louisiana as a recent and informative example. Part II also examines 
other paths to state policy reform, describing a winning 2016 ballot 
initiative adopted in Oklahoma when state legislative reform appeared 
impossible, and a less encouraging experience in Alaska where 2016 
reforms are already being reexamined. The essay then offers several 
examples of policy changes inspired by state executive branch officials, 
such as the Maryland Attorney General, and judicial administrators. Bail 
reform is one area in which policy change has been possible at the city 
level, including in Biloxi, Mississippi, and New Orleans, either by local 
legislative action or in settlement of litigation challenging previous bail 
practices. As Part II shows, supportive public opinion has been a critical 
part of the equation in reform campaigns. 
Part III considers the role of litigation in reform efforts, 
especially where public support or political will is lacking. Supreme 
Court precedent has effectively precluded the federal courts from 
reviewing legislative sentencing schemes for cruelty or irrationality.3 
The Court has also disfavored federal judicial review of racial profiling 
or racially discriminatory sentencing.4 This Part explains why the federal 
courts nevertheless have an essential role to play in raising the level of 
fairness in the administration of criminal justice, offering Gideon v. 
Wainwright as a positive example of federal court intervention. The 
Court interpreted the Sixth Amendment as mandating that states provide 
counsel for indigent criminal defendants because a number of states had 
 
 3 See infra text accompanying notes 108–11. 
 4 See infra text accompanying note 113. 
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persistently failed to shoulder that obligation on their own.5 Litigation 
continues to be necessary to implement Gideon’s decree, as entirely too 
many jurisdictions still do not provide adequate funding for indigent 
defense.6 Regardless of the posture of the federal courts, state courts 
have the opportunity to play a greater role in ensuring that both criminal 
justice policy and implementation are fair and non-discriminatory in 
their own states.7 
Part IV looks at additional strategies for reducing incarceration 
rates by focusing on the role of prosecutors, who wield considerable 
power to expand or reduce the pipeline to prison even in the absence of 
legislative change. To constrain the power of prosecutors, we need to 
look beyond the legislatures and the courts to the people themselves. 
The people in each state or community can and should play a role in 
getting prosecutors to change ingrained practices leading to overly harsh 
or discriminatory treatment, or in using their electoral power to change 
the prosecutors themselves. 
The conclusion comments on how the Constitution provides 
support for a populist criminal justice system nevertheless constrained 
by judicial review. 
I. PRECONDITIONS FOR REFORM 
Why do some reform efforts succeed while others sputter? The 
best recipe for change includes bipartisan support for reform efforts, 
focus on the most promising level of government, and mobilizing 
supportive public opinion. 
A. Bipartisanship 
To avoid gridlock in today’s hyper-partisan legislatures, 
bipartisan support of reform measures is generally a necessity. 
Fortunately, bipartisanship is flourishing in many areas of the criminal 
justice reform agenda. 
Recent scholarship has been hammering the point that our 
current state of mass incarceration is not, as the conventional wisdom 
might have had it, entirely attributable to tough on crime strategies 
associated with the Republican Party. Historians have complicated the 
 
 5 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring assignment of counsel for indigent criminal 
defendants). See infra Part II.B. 
 6 See infra text accompanying notes 117–28. 
 7 See infra text accompanying note 121. 
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politics of criminal justice reform by examining connections between 
mass incarceration and liberal programs like the War on Poverty,8 
maintaining that it is overly simplistic to attribute the rise of 
incarceration to the War on Drugs,9 and noting the biracial origins of 
some policing and sentencing policies now seen as oppressive.10 
Instead of responding to these revisionist histories by engaging 
in louder arguments about who is really at fault for the 
counterproductive policies of the past, we can use this contested history 
as an opportunity to forge greater agreement about directions for the 
future. If it is unclear who is to be blamed for where we are, no one need 
lose face by changing direction. 
There is currently considerable agreement across the political 
aisle on much of the ACLU reform program outlined above. What might 
seem to be strange bedfellow alliances appear in sponsorship of reform 
bills and in civic organization coalitions.11 The conservative group Right 
on Crime, for example, has co-sponsored both conferences and reform 
legislation with the ACLU. The group’s website explains that reform is 
consistent with many fundamental conservative values: 
 
 8 See, e.g., ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON 
CRIME 1–18, 63–95 (2016) (drawing connections between the two “wars”); NAOMI 
MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 69–
112 (2014) (addressing the involvement of liberals); James Forman, Jr., Fortress 
America, NATION (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/fortress-
america/ (describing how 20th century liberals helped create mass incarceration). 
 9 See JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND 
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 5–6, 21–45 (2017) (arguing that the emphasis on 
drug offenders as the major component of incarceration is misplaced). 
 10 See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
IN BLACK AMERICA (2017) (analyzing support for war on crime policies of the 
1970s by African-American leaders in urban centers); MICHAEL JAVEN FORTNER, 
BLACK SILENT MAJORITY: THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS AND THE POLITICS OF 
PUNISHMENT (2015) (describing how support for New York’s draconian drug laws 
united the “black silent majority” and conservative Republicans, while the white 
liberal establishment pushed in the opposite direction). See also MARIE 
GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS (2015) (noting that a simplistic racial analysis is complicated by gender, 
class, etc.).  
 11 See, e.g., John Malcolm & Susan Herman, ACLU, Heritage Foundation Agree: 
Reform Forfeiture Laws, DES MOINES REG. (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/2015/09/09/aclu-
heritage-foundation-agree-reform-forfeiture-laws/71966978/ (noting that ACLU 
and Heritage, while disagreeing on other issues, agree about the need to reform 
asset forfeiture law). 
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As the number of laws increased and the prison 
population soared, conservatives chafed at the waste of 
human potential and increasing cost of the prison 
bureaucracy. They were frustrated that so little was 
being done to prepare inmates for their release, and they 
were appalled at the overcrowded conditions, violence 
and rape, and the lack of medical care, drug treatment 
and mental-health services. Conservatives joined with 
liberals in backing such important reforms as the Prison 
Rape Elimination Act, the Second Chance Act and the 
Fair Sentencing Act. . . . The endorsement of the 
reforms by these national conservative leaders 
encouraged Republican legislators to vote for the 
reforms, and it gave political “cover” to Democrats 
leery of being labeled soft on crime. . . . 12 
 
Indeed, the American Conservative Union Foundation, the Cato 
Institute, the Faith and Freedom Coalition, the Family Research Council, 
the Heritage Foundation, and the Institute for Justice, are all playing 
major roles in the conservative movement for reforms. The Koch 
brothers are investing substantially in criminal justice reform, including 
sentencing reform,13 reducing over-criminalization,14 and promoting 
“second chances.”15 
These organizations, in combination with the efforts of the 
 
 12 Pat Nolan, Conservatives and Liberals Join Together for Criminal Justice 
Reforms, RIGHT ON CRIME (Apr. 16, 2015), 
http://rightoncrime.com/2015/04/conservatives-and-liberals-join-together-for-
criminal-justice-reforms/. Right on Crime is a project of the Texas Public Policy 
Foundation in cooperation with the American Conservative Union Foundation and 
the Prison Fellowship. See http://rightoncrime.com/about/. 
 13 “Too many people go to prison—often for far too long—for low-level, 
nonviolent crimes. People who break the law should be held accountable, but the 
punishment should fit the crime.” Criminal Justice & Policing Reform, CHARLES 
KOCH INST., https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/criminal-justice-
policing-reform/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
 14 “Thousands of seemingly ordinary activities, like shipping lobsters in the wrong 
kind of container and shampooing hair without a license, are classified as crimes. 
We shouldn’t criminalize so many things, and jail should be reserved for people 
who are truly dangerous.” Id. 
 15 “Thousands of laws erect barriers for those with a criminal record to getting jobs 
and rejoining their communities with dignity, increasing the likelihood of 
recidivism.” Id.  
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ACLU and its other allies, have generated tremendous energy. This has 
led to some significant progress in many states, lowering the prison 
population by about five percent since 200916 and promising further 
reductions in the near future. But as in any coalition, there will 
inevitably be differences as well as agreement among the participants.17 
As will be discussed, effecting further reduction of the prison population 
may be more challenging, especially with respect to people convicted of 
a crime involving violence.18 
B. Level of Government 
A second precondition for criminal justice reform in our era is 
maintaining appropriate focus on state and local reform rather than 
expecting a national cure or even leadership from the federal 
government. In Congress, modest federal sentencing and policy reforms 
that once seemed promising have become stalled in legislative gridlock. 
A tremendous amount of bipartisan coalition work went into crafting 
and lobbying for the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017, 
which aims to reduce sentences for low-level, nonviolent offenders in 
the federal system.19 This legislation, sponsored by Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Charles Grassley and cosponsored by a bipartisan group of 
Senators, seemed likely to pass before the 2016 elections. But of course 
not all members of Congress agreed with the Act’s provisions, and the 
 
 16 See Abigail Geiger, U.S. Private Prison Population Has Declined in Recent 
Years, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/11/u-s-private-prison-population-has-declined-in-recent-years/. 
 17 See, e.g., Alex Sarch, How to Solve the Biggest Issue Holding up Criminal 
Justice Reform, POLITICO (May 16, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/05/criminal-justice-reform-mens-rea-
middle-ground-000120 (explaining how although both political parties agree that 
one area of the criminal justice system, mens rea, needs reform, they have 
struggled to agree on the particulars). 
 18 See infra text accompanying notes 43, 88. 
 19 See Karoun Demirjian, Bipartisan Senate Group Unveils Latest Attempt at 
Sentencing Overhaul, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/bipartisan-senate-group-unveils-
latest-attempt-at-sentencing-reform/2017/10/04/71d5ccea-a94b-11e7-850e-
2bdd1236be5d_story.html?utm_term=.97d8e939f3ab (discussing how members of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee have worked for five years on the specifics of the 
criminal justice reform bill introduced in October 2017); see also Bill Keller, Will 
2017 be the Year of Criminal Justice Reform?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/will-2017-be-the-year-of-criminal-
justice-reform.html (discussing the factors that could make 2017 a productive year 
for criminal justice reform).  
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partisan politics of Congress have since turned toxic. In February 2017, 
the current U.S. Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, opposed passage of the 
Act,20 having previously expressed ardent support for precisely the mass 
incarceration/war on drugs policies the reform movement seeks to get 
past.21 This Act may yet become law and serve as a positive example, 
but at this point Congress would be following the states rather than 
taking the lead. And in any event, the federal prison population is only a 
small fraction of the population of state and local prisons and jails.22 
The federal government could play a different kind of positive 
role by supporting state and local reform, as proposed in another piece 
of pending federal legislation, the Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act, 
introduced in October by Representatives Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Carlos 
Curbelo (R-FL), joined by Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) and Mia Love (R-
UT). This companion to the pending Senate bail reform bill (with 
identical language) previously introduced by Senators Kamala Harris 
(D-CA) and Rand Paul (R-KY)23 would provide grants to states that are 
working to eliminate their money bail systems. The Justice 
Reinvestment initiative, a similar approach, was successfully employed 
in an earlier federal-state, private-public collaboration that used federal 
grants to promote reform at the state and local levels.24 Most of the 
states have modified their sentencing practices in recent years and 
reduced their prison populations, often as result of this initiative.25  
Although the states are the principal venue for reform of 
 
 20 Letter from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen. of U.S., to Charles Grassley, Chairman, 
Comm. of the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000161-966d-da6b-ade9-fefd38e20001. 
 21 See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Attorney General Orders Tougher Sentences, Rolling Back 
Obama Policy, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/us/politics/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-
drug-offenses-penalties.html.  
 22 See E. Ann Carlson & Elizabeth Anderson, Prisoners in 2015, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf; see 
also Matt Ferner, Americans are Sick of the ‘Tough on Crime’ Era, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/federal-justice-reform-
poll_us_56be1a95e4b08ffac124f71e (discussing polling showing support for 
reforms to the federal prison system, which only houses one tenth of the country’s 
inmates).  
 23 Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act of 2017, S.1593, 115th Cong. (2017); see also 
Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act of 2017, H.R.4019, 115th Cong. (2017) 
 24 See infra Part II. 
 25 See infra text accompanying notes 32–51. 
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criminalization and sentencing policies, certain issues lend themselves to 
even more localized attention. Cities and other units of local government 
have been taking the lead on reform of bail practices, for example,26 
showing that strategies for reform also need to take account of the 
political organization of each state’s subdivisions in deciding whether 
reform can best be achieved at the state, county, or city/village level. 
C. Public Opinion 
Another critical precondition for successful reform efforts is 
fertile public opinion. There is some good news on this front. Polling 
shows that the public throughout the country has become increasingly 
receptive to some forms of change.27 Majorities of voters across the 
country have been willing to rethink ostensibly “tough-on-crime,” 
lengthy sentences and favor alternatives to incarceration—at least with 
respect to nonviolent crime.28 A growing majority has favored 
alternatives to prison, including drug courts and treatment options, for 
low-level drug offenses.29 
But here too, the conditions leading to modest success so far 
may not bode well for a broader range of potential future reforms. 
Whether the public’s receptivity to reconsidering criminal justice policy 
can extend to other areas, including sentencing or parole reform for 
 
 26 See infra text accompanying notes 98.  
 27 See PFAFF, supra note 9, at 161–62 (asserting that “tough on crime” attitudes are 
beginning to falter).  
 28 See Attitudes Toward Approaches to Lowering the Crime Rate in the United 
States, GALLUP POLL (Dec. 21, 2010), 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2282; 91 Percent of Americans Support 
Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds, ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/91-percent-americans-support-criminal-justice-reform-
aclu-polling-finds; Justin McCarthy, Americans Divided on Priorities for Criminal 
Justice System, GALLUP, INC. (Oct. 14, 2016), (finding that Republicans prioritize 
strengthening law and order through greater enforcement while Democrats 
emphasize court and police reforms to reduce bias against minorities), 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/196394/americans-divided-priorities-criminal-justice-
system.aspx; National Survey Key Findings – Federal Sentencing & Prisons, THE 
MELLMAN GRP. (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/02/national_survey_key_findings_fe
deral_sentencing_prisons.pdf (presenting polls showing support for reducing 
sentences for federal drug offenders).  
 29 See America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/04/02/americas-new-drug-policy-landscape/ 
(noting that two-thirds of those polled supported treatment rather than harsh 
sentences for drug offenders). 
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those charged with offenses involving violence, is an important open 
question. 
Public opinion about criminal justice continues to be distorted by 
erroneous beliefs about crime rates. Fifty-seven percent of those polled 
in late 2016 believed that crime rates have increased since 2008, despite 
the fact that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Bureau of Justice 
Statistics reports show that crime rates in general sharply declined 
during that period.30 
One of the most significant questions for the future of criminal 
justice reform is whether public opinion will continue to move toward 
acceptance of data-driven solutions, or whether exaggerated fear of 
violent crime will stymy further reduction of the prison population. 
Another key question is whether racial bias in the criminal justice 
system will remain a polarizing issue.31 
II. LAW REFORM MODELS– PRIORITIZING APPROACHES 
State legislatures, which enact criminal laws and formulate 
sentencing policy, have generally been the focus of campaigns to reduce 
the prison population. The legislative model of reform makes sense 
where a state’s criminal justice policy itself overreaches—like excessive 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws. But legislative politics are 
complex and sometimes even measures favored by a majority of voters 
fail to be adopted. 
Alternatives in this situation include using a ballot initiative and 
going directly to the people, or seeking administrative reform from 
executive, judicial, or local officials with power to change policy—
albeit sometimes in a more limited manner or geographic area. 
It is also worth noting how often success in a particular state has 
been fueled by a nation-wide campaign. 
A. Legislative Reform 
1. Louisiana—Justice Reinvestment and Successful 
State Legislative Reform 
The Justice Reinvestment initiative played a major role, directly 
or indirectly, in at least thirty-three states reforming their incarceration 
 
 30 John Gramlich, Voters Perception of Crime Continue to Conflict with Reality, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/11/16/voters-perceptions-of-crime-continue-to-conflict-with-reality/. 
 31 See infra text accompanying notes 52–59. 
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policies.32 Launched in 2007, this public-private partnership has 
included the United States Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Council of State 
Governments Justice Center, the Crime and Justice Institute, the Vera 
Institute of Justice, and other organizations.33 
The central concept is to reduce a state’s incarceration costs and 
reinvest some portion of the saved resources in programs designed to 
reduce the need for incarceration—like creating alternatives to 
incarceration and drug courts. Participating states have created an inter-
branch, bipartisan task force to examine ideas for data-driven policy 
changes. Reform efforts, often euphemistically described as 
“comprehensive,” focus on sentencing policy, sometimes on conditions 
governing release from prison, supervision of parolees or probationers, 
and sometimes on oversight laws to measure the progress of reform.34 
The legislature is then asked to enact the reform proposals.35 
Louisiana, one of the most recent states to have adopted some 
sentencing and other reforms, is a good example of the mechanics and 
rhetoric of modestly successful change. 
First, politically diverse reform coalitions made the case that 
reform of Louisiana’s incarceration policies, beyond some changes the 
state had previously adopted in 2011, was financially and logically 
essential. 36 The campaign emphasized that: 
• Louisiana had the highest incarceration rate in the world, 
 
 32 33 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice Reinvestment, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRS. (Dec. 2, 2016), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/12/33_states_reform_criminal_justi
ce_policies_through_justice_reinvestment; see also Justice Reinvestment Initiative, 
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/Programs/jri_background.html 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017).  
 33 See id. 
 34 See id. 
 35 The Justice Reinvestment concept has not escaped criticism. See GOTTSCHALK, 
supra note 10, at 98–116 (criticizing the reinvestment concept as myopic and 
impotent to fight the tenacity of the carceral state). 
 36 Report and Recommendations, LA. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE 62 
(Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.lasc.org/documents/LA_Task_Force_Report_2017_FINAL.pdf 
(“Louisiana’s prison population dropped 9 percent from its peak between 2012 and 
2015. This drop was driven . . . by retroactive reforms . . . passed in 2010, as well 
as . . . when Louisiana first launched a Justice Reinvestment process in 2011 and 
2012. . . . In 2016, the impact of these reforms began to wane, and reductions in the 
population slowed.”). 
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incarcerating five times as many people as Iran, thirteen times as 
many as China, and twenty times as many as Germany; 
• Louisiana’s imprisonment rate had more than quadrupled in the 
last forty years despite the crime index falling by more than forty 
percent over the past two decades; 
• Because of this high imprisonment rate, Louisiana ended up 
spending more than $625 million per year on corrections. 
• If Louisiana’s incarceration rate were the same as Oklahoma’s 
(the second highest in the United States), Louisiana taxpayers 
would have saved nearly forty-nine million dollars in 2014.37 
A carefully composed inter-branch bipartisan task force, called 
the Louisiana Justice Reinvestment Task Force, examined practices in 
Texas, Georgia, Alabama, and other states that had previously adopted 
data-driven policy changes. After this study, the Task Force Report 
recommended that Louisiana lawmakers adopt a number of reforms, 
including reducing penalties for low-level drug and property crimes and 
expanding alternatives to prison.38 
The task force report sounds themes common to successful 
justice reinvestment efforts in other states: smart (“data-driven” or 
“evidence-based”) reform would save the taxpayers money 
(“Louisiana’s taxpayers are not getting a good public safety return on 
investment”) but without endangering the public (“Focus prison beds on 
those who pose a serious threat to public safety”). Justice Reinvestment 
was envisioned as setting in motion a positive cycle of events: freeing up 
prison beds would free up financial resources, strategic reinvestment of 
some of those resources would improve public safety by reducing 
recidivism, and the decrease in crime would in turn contain prison 
expansion.39 The Task Force predicted that if the proposed reforms were 
adopted, there would be an overall reduction in the Louisiana prison 
population of thirteen percent by 2027.40 
 
 37 LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTERNATIVES, https://www.prisonreformla.com/ (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
 38 Report and Recommendations, supra note 36.  
 39 See 33 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice Reinvestment, 
supra note 32. The states listed in the report as adopting some reforms are, starting 
in 2007 and continuing through 2016, Texas, Nevada, Kansas, Vermont, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, South Carolina, Ohio, North Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, Kentucky, 
Arkansas, Oklahoma, Hawaii, Georgia, Delaware, Montana, West Virginia, South 
Dakota, Oregon, Mississippi, Idaho, Nebraska, Utah, Maryland, and Alaska.  
 40 Report and Recommendations, supra note 36. 
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Expert studies on what works were touted as an appropriate 
benchmark. On the economic front, the report announced that over half 
of the projected savings—$154 million over ten years—would be 
reinvested in “research-based programs that reduce recidivism and 
services that support victims of crime.”41 
Rhetoric played a role too. Some parts of the Task Force report 
were written in a curiously indirect manner, perhaps in an attempt to 
avoid raising the specter of hordes of people marching out of the 
prisons: the reforms “would avert the projected growth in the number of 
prisoners in Louisiana and bend the prison population downward.”42 
And the report frequently reiterated that proposed sentencing reforms to 
reduce prison terms targeted low-level, non-violent offenders. 
Nevertheless, the Louisiana District Attorneys Association 
posted a disclaimer at the very beginning of the report, immediately 
following the table of contents: “The Louisiana District Attorneys 
Association (LDAA) is committed to working within the goals of HCR 
82 that include focusing prison space on serious and violent offenders. 
Therefore, any policy recommendations contained in the Justice 
Reinvestment Task Force Report that go beyond nonviolent and non-
serious offenders the LDAA opposes.”43 
In 2017, conditions in Louisiana were fairly conducive to 
reform, despite partial resistance from the district attorneys’ association. 
Coalitions formed. “Louisianans for Prison Alternatives” (founded by 
the ACLU of Louisiana, Southern Poverty Law Center, and Voice of the 
Experience) worked with conservative groups including Right on 
Crime44 plus bipartisan groups, business organizations, and lawmakers, 
to educate the public and to lobby for change.45 
It is hard to say what impact these particular efforts actually had 
on public opinion, but polls showed that Louisianans did strongly 
 
 41 Id. at 7. 
 42 Id. at 8. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Elain Ellerbe, Louisiana Justice Reinvestment Task Force Recommendations for 
Criminal Justice Reform Released Today, RIGHT ON CRIME (Mar. 16, 2017), 
http://rightoncrime.com/2017/03/louisiana-justice-reinvestment-task-force-
recommendations-for-criminal-justice-reform-released-today/.  
 45 See LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTERNATIVES, supra note 37. The coalition 
mobilized over six-hundred supporters to drive or bus to Baton Rouge on a humid 
day in April, and generated hundreds of cards and letters and thousands of emails 
and telephone calls. Sample message: “Getting tough on crime wasted money and 
didn’t make us any safer. Get the facts.” Id.  
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support “evidence-based programs that reduce reoffending over longer 
prison sentences.”46 This support, combined with precedents set in other 
conservative states like Texas and Georgia, helped to convince the 
Louisiana legislature to adopt a “comprehensive” package of criminal 
justice reforms without getting caught up in the procedural red tape or 
anti-reform backlash that thwarted legislative efforts in some other 
states.47 Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards signed the legislation.48 
It was indeed politically possible in Louisiana to persuade politicians not 
to fear endorsing policies that were not conventionally tough on crime. 
Local jurisdictions instituted their own reforms, adding to the 
state’s efforts. In January 2017, the New Orleans City Council 
unanimously passed a municipal bail reform ordinance eliminating 
money bail for most municipal charges.49 A coalition was behind this 
effort as well: the Orleans Parish Prison Reform Coalition, which 
included ACLU advocates. Baton Rouge is now a target for similar bail 
reforms. 
Similar positive stories can be told about legislative reform in 
other highly conservative states. Mississippi, for example, enacted a 
sweeping criminal justice reform measure in 2014. House Bill 585 
reduced the state’s prison population by about ten percent 
(approximately 1900 people) and reduced the prison budget by two 
 
 46 Adam Gelb & Andrew Page, Voters in Louisiana and Oklahoma Strongly Favor 
Alternatives to Incarceration, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June 28, 2017), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2017/06/28/voters-in-
louisiana-and-oklahoma-strongly-favor-alternatives-to-incarceration (“Majorities 
supported ending mandatory minimums, lessening penalties for low-level drug 
offenses, increasing the fairness of fines and fees, and prioritizing reduced 
reoffending over long prison sentences. Three in 4 Louisiana voters, including 
majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents, backed a proposal to stop 
imprisoning people for most parole and probation violations and to instead impose 
sanctions, such as community service. More than half of Louisiana’s prison 
admissions each year are for such supervision failures, and non-prison sanctions 
could prevent many of those admissions, easing the strain on facilities and making 
better use of public safety resources.”).  
 47 See infra Part I.B, text accompanying notes 75–77 (addressing vested interests of 
Oklahoma prosecutors); see also infra Part I.C, text accompanying note 96 
(addressing vested interests of Maryland bail bondsmen). 
 48 Rebekah Allen, Gov. Edwards Signs Criminal Justice Overhaul into Law, in 
What Some Laud as Historic Achievement, THE ADVOCATE (June 15, 2017), 
http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_168c6d6
e-5089-11e7-a0d6-7f67135f59a4.html. 
 49 Municipal Bail Reform, ORLEANS PARISH PRISON REFORM COALITION, 
https://opprcnola.org/bail (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).  
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hundred million dollars over ten years.50 Mississippi legislators 
continued to consider bills to build on HB 585, including additional 
parole and reentry reforms.51 
These successes are heartening. The people of Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas were interested in evidence about what actually 
works to reduce crime and moved beyond the vaunted tough-on-crime 
strategies of the past. Of course, with the public being told that they 
could simultaneously save money, reduce the prison population, reduce 
crime, and better support crime victims, the choices before them may 
not have seemed all that difficult. 
But there is also reason to be circumspect about the Louisiana 
experience. First, reducing the prison population by approximately ten 
percent is nowhere near the fifty percent reduction for which the ACLU 
has called. Perhaps a forecasted ten percent reduction in prison 
population can grow incrementally if money continues to be pared off 
the corrections budget and reinvested in alternatives to incarceration. 
But dramatic reductions in incarceration ultimately will need to 
encompass violent offenders as well, and both the Task Force and 
District Attorneys Association seemed to assume that Louisianans would 
not tolerate that result. Reducing prison sentences for low-level non-
violent offenders is the low-hanging fruit. 
Another disappointing feature of the Louisiana task force report 
is that it steers clear of issues relating to race. In seventy-six pages, the 
report simply does not mention the demographics of Louisiana prisons 
or the connections between racial bias and incarceration rates. This is 
not because Louisiana has no problem on that front. The prison 
population in Louisiana is 66.4%African American and 33.2% white;52 
the population of the state is 63.2% white and 32.6% African 
 
 50 Gov. Phil Bryant signs criminal justice reform bill spearheaded by Pascagoula 
Sen. Brice Wiggins, GULFLIVE.COM (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press-
news/2014/03/gov_phil_bryant_signs_criminal.html (note careful balanced 
language). 
 51 Arielle Dreher, Reforming Criminal Justice: Is Mississippi Making Progress?, 
JACKSON FREE PRESS (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2017/feb/01/reforming-criminal-justice-
mississippi-making-prog/ (describing how state prison populations, as well as 
parole applications and approvals, have changed since the implementation of 
HB585).  
 52 LA DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRS., DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES OF ADULT 
PRISON POPULATION (2017).  
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American.53 African Americans are approximately four times as likely to 
be incarcerated in Louisiana as white people.54 
Reduction in a state’s overall prison population does not 
necessarily cure the racial disproportion of who is incarcerated. In New 
Jersey, for example, reform efforts led to an overall reduction in the 
state’s prison population of 9.5% over three years,55 but the most recent 
figures show that African Americans in New Jersey are nevertheless 
about twelve times as likely as white people to be incarcerated.56 
It is troubling to consider why the carefully crafted messaging of 
the Louisiana Task Force scrupulously avoided the issue of race. Rather 
than offering the deplorable racial bias in Louisiana’s criminal justice 
system as an additional powerful justification for reform, the Task Force 
chose not to mention that aspect of the problem. Was this because the 
authors believed that Louisianans would be apathetic about racial 
injustice, or because they believed that talking about race would be 
counterproductive? 
One study on communications efforts regarding criminal justice 
reform concluded that: 
 
[C]ertain messages are more effective than others at 
increasing public support for eliminating incarceration 
for nonviolent offenses. I found that emphasizing the 
high financial costs of incarceration, the ineffectiveness 
of prison as a crime reduction tool, and the massive 
 
 53 QuickFacts Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/LA.  
 54 According to the Sentencing Project, based on Bureau of Justice Statistics 
figures, the rate of incarceration is 438 per 100,000 for white people in Louisiana, 
and 1740 per 100,000 for African American people. Ashley Nellis, The Color of 
Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 
(2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-
of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf at 5. 
 55 See S.P. Sullivan, How N.J. Became a Nationwide Leader in Reducing Prison 
Population, NJ.COM (Oct. 31, 2015), 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/10/nj_cutting_prison_populations_faster
_than_most_sta.html. 
 56 The Sentencing Project, supra note 54 (white people in New Jersey incarcerated 
at a rate of 94 per 100,000; African Americans at a rate of 1140 per 100,000); S.P. 
Sullivan, Racial Disparity in N.J. Prison rates Highest in U.S., Report Finds, NJ.COM (June 14, 
2016), 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/06/nj_has_12_times_more_black_prison
ers_than_white_on.html. 
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growth in the use of incarceration caused by harsher 
sentencing (not more crime) were most effective. By 
contrast, emphasizing racial disparities in incarceration, 
the harm done to children, and the mental health, 
substance abuse, and childhood challenges common 
among people in prison—while important points— were 
no more effective in increasing support for criminal 
justice reform than providing no message at all.57 
 
While it is disappointing if the public does not find reducing 
racial bias to be a motivation for reform, it may be a positive 
development if attention to race does not undermine otherwise 
promising reforms. 
Race has long bedeviled sentencing policy. Reactions to the 
crack epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s seemed inextricably tied to the 
fact that crack, unlike powder cocaine, tended to be used by African 
Americans.58 What was considered appropriate punishment for a crack 
offense was draconian in itself and one hundred times as severe as 
punishment for a comparable cocaine offense.59 
 
 57 Aaron Gottlieb, Criminal Justice Reform during the Trump Administration, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 22, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/criminal-
justice-reform-during-the-trump-administration_us_592310eae4b07617ae4cbe37; 
see also Russell Berman, A Poll-Tested Message for Criminal-Justice Reform, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/the-complicated-politics-of-
criminal-justice-reform/463284/ (discussing data that shows criminal justice reform 
messaging is more effective in swing states when discussing issues of government 
spending and waste).  
 58 For example, when Congress passed the Crack Cocaine Amendment in 2007, 
roughly 86% of prisoners with crack cocaine convictions who qualified for a 
reduced sentence were African American. See Glenn Schmitt et al., Analysis of the 
Impact of the Crack Cocaine Amendment If Made Retroactive, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N (Oct. 3, 2007), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/retroactivity-analyses/impact-analysis-crack-
amendment/20071003_Impact_Analysis.pdf.  
 59 The United States Sentencing Commission later found that federal sentencing 
ranges for convictions involving crack cocaine, one hundred times sentences 
authorized for the same quantity of non-crack cocaine, led to severe and unjustified 
racial disparities in sentencing. See The Crack Sentencing Disparity and the Road 
to 1:1, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-training 
seminar/2009/016b_Road_to_1_to_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). Congress 
reacted to these findings, passing a Fair Sentencing Act in 2010, S. 17, 111th Cong. 
(2010), but did not achieve parity in sentencing, settling for reducing the 100:1 
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The current opioid epidemic may provide an opportunity to 
extricate the debate over drug policy from issues of race and racism that 
have plagued previous efforts to reform drug sentencing. The face of the 
opioid epidemic is white.60 If we are now willing to adopt more humane 
drug policies, that change of attitude could be taken as both progress on 
the criminal justice front and a sad commentary on our lack of progress 
in confronting racial bias. 
Will general apathy toward concerns about racial bias and 
mental illness, combined with exaggerated fear of violent crime, limit 
the horizon of the next round of legislative reform? Or can the public 
learn to appreciate these concerns as well?61 
2. Oklahoma—”Leave the People’s Voice Alone”: 
Unsuccessful Legislative Reform and a Ballot 
Initiative 
Oklahoma, another deeply conservative state, had the second-
highest overall incarceration rate in the country and the highest 
incarceration rate for women.62 In 2016, its prisons were at 119% of 
capacity.63 
Republican Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, 
Kris Steele, tried to persuade the state legislature to adopt meaningful 
measures to reduce the prison population without success.64 So he 
 
ratio to 18:1. See Fair Sentencing Act, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
https://www.ussc.gov/topic/fair-sentencing-act (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
 60 Why Is the Opioid Epidemic Overwhelmingly White?, NPR (Nov. 4, 2017, 5:43 
PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/04/562137082/why-is-the-opioid-epidemic-
overwhelmingly-white. 
 61 Although statistics show strong public support for addressing substance abuse 
and mental health in criminal justice reform, a large number of respondents are still 
apathetic. See Americans Support Expanding Addiction Treatment, LEGAL ACTION 
CENTER (Nov. 2015), https://lac.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Survey-top.png; 
see also Concern Too Many Non-Violent Drug Offenders are Imprisoned, LEGAL 
ACTION CENTER (Nov. 2015), https://lac.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Survey-
bottom.png.   
 62 OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, https://okjusticereform.org (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018).  
 63 Brian Hardzinski, Fallin Presents Budget, Unveils Teacher Pay Raise and 
Correction Reform, KGOU-FM (Feb. 2, 2016) http://kosu.org/post/fallin-presents-
budget-unveils-teacher-pay-raise-and-corrections-reforms. 
 64 See Graham Lee Brewer, Is Criminal Justice Reform on the table for the 2015 
Legislative Session?, NEWSOK (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://newsok.com/article/5369665 (explaining how Oklahoma’s adherence to a 
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agreed to become chair of an ACLU-led effort to take the issue of 
reform directly to the people of Oklahoma. This broad-based coalition, 
Oklahomans for Criminal Justice Reform,65 proposed two ballot 
initiatives. The first initiative, Proposition 780, reclassified certain low-
level crimes, like drug possession and low-level property offenses, as 
misdemeanors instead of felonies, resulting in reducing the number of 
people in the prisons by reducing the length of sentences. The second 
initiative, Proposition 781, provided that the cost savings triggered by 
the decreased corrections spending were to be invested in addressing the 
root causes of crime through rehabilitation programs to treat drug 
addiction and mental health conditions and through education and job 
training programs to help low-level offenders turn their lives around, 
find employment on release, and avoid going back to prison66—basically 
the Justice Reinvestment platform. 
The publicity for the Oklahoma initiatives, like the Louisiana 
Task Force Report, sounded both pragmatic and financial themes,67 also 
emphasizing that the offenders targeted were nonviolent. Polls showed 
that a strong majority of prospective Oklahoma voters favored 
sentencing reform for nonviolent offenders.68 Interestingly, seventy-
seven percent of Oklahomans said they knew someone who was or had 
been in jail, prison, or another type of correctional facility,69 perhaps 
giving these otherwise abstract issues a sympathetic human face. With a 
 
“tough on crime” approach creates a difficult political climate for criminal justice 
reform to succeed). 
 65 OKLAHOMANS FOR JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 62. Oklahomans for Criminal 
Justice Reform included Oklahoma Council of Public Affairs, Right on Crime, the 
Oklahoma Policy Institute, the Tulsa Regional Chamber, the Greater Oklahoma 
City Chamber of Commerce, ReMerge, the Oklahoma Women’s Coalition, the 
ACLU, and Women in Recovery. 
 66 See State Questions 780 and 781: Criminal Justice Reform, OKLA. POL’Y INST. 
(Sept. 12, 2016), https://okpolicy.org/state-questions-780-781-criminal-justice-
reform/. 
 67 Launch Announcement, supra note 62 (stating that Oklahoma’s incarceration 
policy “costs taxpayers nearly $500 million annually and drains significant 
resources away from investments that can do more to enhance public safety. As the 
state’s prison population continues growing—increasing by 12 percent between 
2009 and 2014—so does its price tag, which has increased by 172 percent in the 
past two decades.”).  
 68 Poll Results Show Strong Support for Reform, OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORM (Apr. 24, 2017), https://okjusticereform.org/updates/poll-results-
show-strong-support-reform/. 
 69 See OKLAHOMANS FOR JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 62. 
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professional communications effort in place,70 the coalition gathered 
230,586 signatures, far more than the number needed to get the 
initiatives on the ballot.71 In November 2016, both initiatives passed 
easily, with support of about fifty-seven percent of voters.72 
But when the legislature convened in February 2017, several 
bills had already been filed to repeal the reform measures, a possibility 
because the initiatives did not amend the state constitution and were thus 
open to legislative modification.73 The legislators who opposed the 
reform measures were clearly outside the bipartisan consensus of most 
Oklahoma voters but protested that the people had not understood for 
what they were voting. The voters did not appreciate this condescension. 
State Senator Ralph Shortey, a supporter of repeal efforts, confronted 
two hundred angry constituents at what was described as a raucous town 
hall meeting in Oklahoma City. “Do your job!” one constituent yelled at 
Shortey. “Leave the people’s voice alone!” According to a reporter 
present, the room broke into applause.74 
Much of the counter-pressure urging legislators to support repeal 
or modification measures was generated by the Oklahoma District 
Attorneys Association. Unlike the Oklahoma voters, most prosecutors in 
the state criticized or opposed the referenda. Steele, chair of the pro-
referendum campaign, remarked, “They are good at scaring and 
pressuring and manipulating lawmakers into passing policies that 
 
 70 Launch Announcement, supra note 62 (“Oklahoma locks up too many of our 
citizens for low-level offenses. We can do better. Let’s work together to ensure that 
our criminal justice system is smarter, makes our communities safer, and gives us 
the return on our taxpayer dollars that we deserve.”). 
 71 We Just Turned in Our Signatures, OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REFORM (June 3, 2016), https://okjusticereform.org/updates/reached-big-
milestone/. 
 72 Kimberly Querry, Oklahoma Voters Pass Criminal Justice Reform State 
Questions, OK NEWS 4 (Nov. 8, 2016), http://kfor.com/2016/11/08/oklahoma-
voters-pass-criminal-justice-reform-state-questions/. 
 73 Rachel Hubbard, Oklahoma Lawmakers File Bills to Repeal Criminal Justice 
Reforms, NPR (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2017/02/07/513904322/oklahoma-lawmakers-file-bills-to-
repeal-criminal-justice-reforms.  
 74 See Bill Miston, Oklahoma Senator Ralph Shortey Submits Resignation Letter 
After Being Charged with Engaging in Child Prostitution, OKLA. NEWS 4 (Mar. 27, 
2017), http://kfor.com/2017/03/22/oklahoma-senator-ralph-shortey-submits-
resignation-letter-after-being-charged-with-felonies-involving-child-prostitution/. 
Shortey resigned from office the following month for other reasons. Id. 
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ultimately benefit their position.”75 
It is particularly interesting that prosecutors who opposed 
implementation of the ballot measures sometimes did so regardless of 
the views of the voters in their own districts. Voters in Oklahoma 
County, which includes Oklahoma City, supported the initiatives by 
almost seventy percent of the vote; but their District Attorney, David 
Prater, opposed the measures.76 Prater insisted, despite contrary 
evidence, that the threat of lengthy prison sentences is a necessary 
incentive for drug addicts to change their behavior. In Tulsa, sixty-five 
percent of voters supported the reforms; opposing Tulsa County District 
Attorney Steve Kunzweiler erroneously maintained that Proposition 780 
would make Oklahoma “the most liberal drug possession state in the 
union.”77 
But the people’s voice did prevail. Also in February 2017, while 
the district attorneys were fighting the ballot initiative round of reform, a 
Task Force assembled by Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin 
recommended that the state take measures to drastically reduce its prison 
population. Officials projected that, without reform, Oklahoma’s overall 
prison population would increase twenty-five percent in the next ten 
years at a cost to the taxpayers of $1.9 billion.78 
Rather than rolling back the ballot measure reforms, the 
Oklahoma legislature took up bills for a second round of reform—to 
sentencing and parole policies.79 But the Oklahoma legislative process 
 
 75 Rory Fleming & Casey Tolan, Oklahomans Voted to Make the State’s Criminal 
Justice System Less Barbaric, SLATE (Mar. 10, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/trials_and_error/2017/03/ 
oklahomans_want_a_less_barbaric_criminal_justice_system_the_state_does_not.ht
ml.  
 76 See id.  
 77 Id. (as the reporter noted, Kunzweiler seemed to overlook the fact that other 
states have decriminalized or legalized marijuana); see also Andrew Freeman, 
Criminal justice Reform Laws Roll out in Oklahoma, NEWS12 (July 6, 2017), 
http://www.kxii.com/content/news/Criminal-justice-reform-laws-roll-out-in-
Oklahoma-433017953.html (addressing district attorney opposition to the initiative 
reforms, prior to roll-out). 
 78 Randy Ellis, Governor’s Task Force calls for decreasing sentences for drug 
crimes, NEWSOK (Feb. 2, 2017), http://newsok.com/article/5536636. 
 79 Round 2: Rally for Criminal Justice Reform, OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORM (May 4, 2017), https://okjusticereform.org/updates/round-2-rally-
criminal-justice-reform/. 
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once again stifled efforts at reform.80 Scott Biggs, a state representative 
from Chickasha who is considered primarily responsible for boxing up 
the new proposals in committee, drew fire for opposing the will of the 
people. His response was that although some of his constituents did 
support criminal justice reform, he believed they would draw the line at 
keeping violent offenders out of prison just to help reduce the inmate 
population and cut costs.81 He proposed further discussions on how to 
hold the line dividing violent and nonviolent offenders. 
Some additional policy reform efforts at the local level 
succeeded in reducing the poverty-to-prison pipeline. Oklahoma City 
instituted indigency hearings for those who cannot pay fines, and own-
recognizance release bonds for people who do not pose a threat to public 
safety.82 The Oklahoma City Council created an Oklahoma County 
Criminal Justice Advisory Council, a cooperative venture between 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma County, Edmond, and Midwest City, to 
consider recommendations of a Vera Institute report.83 “With U.S. 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions planning to visit the state in October to 
discuss criminal justice reform with the Oklahoma Sheriffs’ 
Association,” the Right on Crime website observed, “the coalition has an 
opportunity to showcase their reforms and show that reductions in jail 
population while increasing public safety and reducing the burden on 
taxpayers is possible.”84 
 
 80 Janelle Stecklein, Oklahoma Criminal Justice Reform Bills Locked up in 
Committee, Proponents Say, CNHI STATE REP. (June 5, 2017), 
http://www.cnhi.com/featured_stories/oklahoma-criminal-justice-reform-bills-
locked-up-in-committee-proponents/article_4bcf5e3e-4a1f-11e7-971c-
f3d2d85ee446.html. 
 81 Id.  
 82 Andrew Speno, A New Era in Criminal Justice for Oklahoma City, RIGHT ON 
CRIME (Oct. 2, 2017), http://rightoncrime.com/2017/10/a-new-era-in-criminal-
justice-for-oklahoma-city/. 
 83 Nomin Ujiyediin, Oklahoma County Law Enforcement, Judicial System to 
Collaborate on Criminal Justice Council, KGOU (Aug. 30, 2017), 
http://kgou.org/post/oklahoma-county-law-enforcement-judicial-system-
collaborate-criminal-justice-council. The report was issued in collaboration with 
the Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Reform Task Force. To reduce the county 
jail admissions and recidivism rates, the report recommended improving data 
collection and analysis to understand the jail’s population, avoiding booking people 
for low-level offenses, and improving addiction and mental health treatment, 
among other measures. Id.  
 84 Andrew Speno, Follow Oklahoma County’s Lead on Criminal Justice, RIGHT ON 
CRIME (Sept. 8, 2017), http://rightoncrime.com/2017/09/follow-oklahoma-countys-
lead-on-criminal-justice/. 
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Polls show that a supermajority of Oklahomans continues to be 
very supportive of expanding the use of alternatives to prison for 
nonviolent crimes and allowing individuals to reduce their probation or 
parole time through good behavior.85 Support is resoundingly bipartisan 
(eighty-one percent of Republicans, eighty-five percent of independents, 
and eighty-eight percent of Democrats approve) and extends to both 
urban and rural areas.86 But the pace of state-wide legislative reform in 
Oklahoma is still sputtering, and local reform is dramatically uneven 
through the state. 
The progress made in Oklahoma is good news, but, here too, 
there is a low ceiling on the impact of policies aimed at diverting drug 
offenders. The prediction was that the initiatives will end up reducing 
the state’s annual prison admissions by twenty to twenty-five percent.87 
Drug offenses constituted thirty-one percent of prison admissions in 
Oklahoma.88 How much further can the state go in reducing 
incarceration without including those convicted of offenses involving 
violence? 
Oklahoma also provides a lesson in the potential force of public 
participation. Once persuaded that sentencing reform was desirable, 
Oklahomans had to overcome two kinds of distortion in their state’s 
political process. First, state legislators did not seem to reflect the views 
of their constituents. The people of Oklahoma took direct action to see 
their will done instead of waiting for the next election cycle and voting 
in different representatives. Ideally, the legislators should have heard 
and heeded that message, as the Louisiana legislature did. Second, 
prosecutors, who are also the people’s elected representatives, were 
more inclined to follow their accustomed, tough-on-crime practices than 
 
 85 Adam Gelb & Andrew Page, Voters in Louisiana and Oklahoma Strongly Favor 
Alternatives to Incarceration, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June 28, 2017), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2017/06/28/voters-in-
louisiana-and-oklahoma-strongly-favor-alternatives-to-incarceration. 
 86 Id.  
 87 See Fleming & Tolan, supra note 75.   
 88  See OKLA. JUSTICE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 10, 20 (2017), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/content.newsok.com/documents/OJRTFFinalReport%20(
1).pdf (showing that forty-two percent of female inmates are admitted for drug 
crimes alone, and thirty-one percent of prison admissions are on drug offenses); see 
also Jonathan Small & Trent England, Oklahoma’s Prison Crisis: The Enormous 
Cost of Doing Nothing, OKLA. COUNCIL OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://www.ocpathink.org/article/oklahomas-prison-crisis-the-enormous-cost-of-
doing-nothing (showing that seventy-five percent of Oklahoma’s inmates were 
sentenced for nonviolent offenses). 
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to follow public opinion, even when that opinion was informed by 
evidence that the policies of the past do not work. Part IV explores how 
the public can use electoral politics to change the behavior of 
prosecutors or the prosecutors themselves. This same electoral strategy 
can apply to legislators. 
3. Alaska: Legislative Reform and Backlash 
Alaska was another criminal justice reform success story. A 
commission proposed reforms to reduce the prison population by 
revising sentencing for low-level offenders.89 The state legislature 
adopted “extensively vetted” reforms which Governor Bill Walker 
signed into law in July 2016.90 
However, half a year later, before the bill’s reforms had become 
fully effective, many of its provisions were being challenged. Members 
of the commission itself questioned whether some of the reforms were 
operating as intended, citing an uptick in crime.91 The most vocal critics 
seemed to include law enforcement officials who may not have been 
committed to the changes the public voted for and many whose opinion 
may have been based on misapprehensions about the legislation itself.92 
Alaska Governor Walker is now supporting increasing some of the 
penalties that had been decreased.93 
Alaska will not be the only place where people who support or 
oppose reform legislation will be debating what happened after the fact: 
whether the reforms failed, or whether lack of understanding of the 
reforms and their consequences boosted a call for retrenchment. A 
number of studies have suggested that reduction in prison population 
 
 89 See ALASKA CRIM. JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT 18 (2015), 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/alaska-criminal-justice-commission. 
 90 See Jerzy Shedlock, Alaska Governor Walker Signs Crime Reform Bill into Law, 
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.adn.com/politics/2016/07/11/alaska-gov-walker-signs-crime-reform-
bill-into-law/.  
 91 See Zaz Hollander, Alaska’s Sweeping New Crime Law Already Under Pressure 
for Change, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/crime-courts/2017/01/25/alaskas-sweeping-new-
crime-law-already-under-pressure-for-change/. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See Nathaniel Herz, Governor Wants Alaska Legislature to Toughen Criminal 
Justice During Special Session, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/crime-courts/2017/09/15/governor-wants-
alaska-legislature-to-toughen-criminal-justice-during-special-session/. 
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does not, as a general matter, correlate with an increase in crime, and 
might even have the opposite effect.94 Whether Alaska is in some 
manner an exception or a negation of those studies remains an issue. 
Alaska’s experience shows that legislative reform can be a long and 
multi-chapter story. 
B. Executive and Judicial Policy at the State and Local 
Levels 
Examples of successful state and local law reform have also 
emerged from policymaking venues other than the state legislative or 
referendum process. 
For example, in Maryland, bail reform began with the state’s 
Attorney General, was instituted by the courts, and then rescued from 
legislative repeal. After Attorney General Brian Frosh issued an opinion 
calling into question the constitutionality of bail practices in Maryland’s 
pretrial system, the state judiciary enacted a rule deprioritizing the use of 
cash bail.95 In a different example of vested interests trying to preserve 
their own prerogatives—and, in this case, profits—the bail bond 
industry fought aggressively to have the legislature reverse this reform.96 
But with the efforts of the Coalition for a Safe and Just Maryland (which 
included the ACLU), that effort was defeated.97 As in Alaska, reform 
efforts turned out to be labor intensive as changes in the new policy 
came under attack even after the battle seemed to be over. 
Policies regarding bail reform are frequently set at the local 
 
 94 See, e.g., Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Inimai Chettiar, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
THE REVERSE MASS INCARCERATION ACT 7 (2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/reverse-mass-incarceration-act 
(showing a decrease in crime rate in jurisdictions with reduced prison populations).  
 95 See Ovetta Wiggins & Ann E. Marimow, Maryland’s Highest Court Overhauls 
the State’s Cash-Based Bail System, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/maryland-highest-court-
overhauls-the-states-cash-based-bail-system/2017/02/07/36188114-ed78-11e6-
9973-c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.49f1d745a228.  
 96 See Michael Dresser, Frosh Warns that Bond Industry-Supported Bail Bill 
Undoes Maryland Court’s Rule, BALT. SUN (Mar. 14, 2017), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-bail-reform-
20170314-story.html (explaining that rival ACLU-supported bill to further move 
away from dependence on cash bail also lost). 
 97 See Caryn York & Larry Stafford, One Small Step Forward on Bail Reform in 
Md., BALT. SUN (June 29, 2017), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-0703-bail-rule-july-
20170629-story.html. 
26
Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjcl/vol23/iss1/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z389882N0J
HERMAN SPRING 2018 
58 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 23:1 
level, as shown by the experiences of New Orleans and Oklahoma 
City,98 compounding the notion that the politics of criminal justice need 
to be local. Experience with bail reform also shows that litigation can be 
essential to spur change. 
Imprisoning people pretrial because they cannot afford to pay 
bail is only one example of the unfair connection between poverty and 
incarceration. Lack of ability to pay fines can lead directly to 
incarceration, a modern-day equivalent of debtors’ prisons, creating a 
vicious cycle where incarceration then exacerbates the prisoner’s 
financial problems. Here too, litigation can be a lever for change. 
For example, the ACLU brought a lawsuit on behalf of Biloxi, 
Mississippi, residents Qumotria Kennedy and Joseph Anderson, alleging 
that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated 
when they were jailed for inability to pay fines.99 Kennedy was locked 
up for five nights following her arrest on a warrant for failure to pay 
traffic fines.100 She was not provided a court hearing on her ability to 
pay, informed of her right to request counsel, or appointed counsel.101 
She was ultimately fired from her part-time cleaning job because she 
missed work while jailed for not paying her fines.102 Joseph Anderson, 
who has a disability, was at home when police arrested him on a warrant 
charging him with failure to pay a traffic fine.103 He was jailed for seven 
nights before finally being brought before the Biloxi Municipal Court.104 
Both Anderson and Kennedy were told that they could avoid jail only if 
they paid the full amount of their fines and fees in cash.105 
The City of Biloxi entered into a settlement making it a model 
for eliminating debtors’ prison practices. The City agreed to a number of 
reforms: issuing bench cards to guide judges in conducting ability-to-
pay hearings and assessing legal alternatives to incarceration; ending the 
use of private probation companies; hiring a full-time public defender; 
 
 98 See supra text accompanying note 49 (New Orleans), note 82 (Oklahoma City). 
See also Lisa Hagen, In Unanimous Vote, Atlanta City Council Approves Cash Bail 
Reform, WABE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.wabe.org/unanimous-vote-atlanta-city-
council-approves-cash-bail-reform/. 
 99 Class Action Complaint at 6, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-CV-00348-
HSO-JCG, 2016 WL 4425862 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 7, 2016). 
 100 Id. at 23.  
 101 Id. at 24–25. 
 102 Id. at 26. 
 103 Id. at 27, 29. 
 104 Id. at 30. 
 105 Kennedy, 2016 WL 4425862 at 23, 29. 
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and prohibiting imposition of fees for people who enter payment plans 
or who are required to perform community service.106 Advocates are 
now working to take reforms based on the Biloxi template state-wide. 
But it is notable that it took a lawsuit to get the city to embrace 
thoughtful solutions. 
Even this small collection of stories shows that achieving policy 
reform requires a different blueprint for every state. One size does not fit 
all, even if national campaigns like Justice Reinvestment can introduce 
the same themes and core reforms to multiple states. National 
organizations play an important role in identifying which states to 
prioritize, which reforms to prioritize, and which branch of government 
at which level to address first. As in a game of dominoes, how much can 
be achieved depends on choosing the right place to start. 
So far, the bottom line condition for persuading elected officials 
to change criminal justice policy has seemed to be public opinion. 
Further progress will depend on whether reformers can create conditions 
for further public education about how a smart and fair criminal justice 
system should work. This is not so much a challenge for law as it is for 
marketing.107 
III. THE JUDICIAL MODEL 
Although criminal justice policy ideally will be of the people, by 
the people, and for the people, there are nevertheless times when the 
counter-majoritarian courts are needed to counteract popular will or 
popular apathy in order to ensure the fairness of criminal justice policy 
or administration. 
A. Judicial Review of Deprivations of Freedom 
The federal courts are unlikely to play any meaningful role in 
reviewing criminalization and sentencing policies for fairness or 
rationality. The Supreme Court has applied only the most deferential 
 
 106 See Stipulated Settlement Agreement and Retention of Jurisdiction at 3–21, 
Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-CV-00348-HSO-JCG, 2016 WL 4425862 
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/kennedy-v-city-
biloxi-stipulated-settlement-agreement-exhibits-b. 
 107 See Nan D. Hunter, Varieties of Constitutional Experience: Direct Democracy 
and the Marriage Equality Campaign, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1662, 1668, 1700 (2017) 
(discussing how communications professionals developed a marketing campaign 
reframing the issues around same-sex marriage and changing public opinion, with 
the result that direct democracy began to work for rather than against marriage 
equality).  
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level of judicial review to state or federal criminal justice policies or 
practices that cost people years of freedom, regardless of how irrational, 
cruel, or counterproductive those policies might be. The Court has 
deferred to state sentencing policy in cases challenging mandatory 
imposition of life imprisonment without any possibility of parole for 
drug possession offenses108 or for minor theft offenses (including 
sentences imposed under three-strikes laws),109 finding that even 
draconian deprivation of freedom for minor offenses does not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
Irrationality is not a basis for federal judicial review of 
sentencing policy. In Chapman v. United States,110 for example, the 
Court upheld a federal sentencing guideline providing a penalty for 
possessing a quantity of LSD on a sugar cube that was many times 
greater than the penalty for possessing the same quantity of LSD on a 
piece of blotter paper.111 It was the combined weight of drug and carrier 
that mattered under the guidelines, not the weight of the controlled 
substance itself. The Court was interested only in whether the 
lawmakers had intended this bizarre result and not whether that 
sentencing scheme irrationally deprives some hapless individuals of 
extra years of freedom merely because they substituted a sugar cube for 
a piece of blotter paper. 
Although the federal courts have taken a hands-off approach in 
this area, state courts could, and perhaps should, take a more active role 
in reviewing whether state sentencing law needlessly deprives 
individuals of years of freedom under policies that do not appreciably 
further any legitimate public interest. 
Neither the federalism concerns underpinning the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to review state policy decisions nor the Court’s 
 
 108 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (holding that life sentence 
without the possibility of parole for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine was not 
cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment). 
 109 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (holding that sentence of life 
imprisonment for stealing videotapes worth $150, a third conviction, was not cruel 
and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment); see also Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (holding that third strike sentence of life 
imprisonment for theft offense was not unconstitutional). 
 110 Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). 
 111 See id. at 458 n.2. If 100 doses of LSD were sold on sugar cubes, the sentence 
would range from 188–235 months; if the same dosage were sold on blotter paper, 
the sentence range would be 63–78 months; if the same dosage were sold in its pure 
liquid form, the range would be 10–16 months. 
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cramped interpretations of the meaning of cruel and unusual 
punishment, denial of equal protection, and denial of due process need 
constrain the state courts. Reformers should think creatively about the 
potential of state constitutional provisions and invite state courts to play 
an active role in reviewing their states’ criminal law and sentencing 
policies as well as criminal procedure. Sherry Colb, for example, has 
argued that courts should regard freedom from incarceration as a 
fundamental right, worthy of more than minimal judicial solicitude.112 
Recognizing the importance of the individual interest at stake, state 
courts could find that excessive state sentences deprive individuals of 
the fundamental right to years of freedom without actually furthering the 
state’s interest in preserving public safety or other proper aims of 
criminal law. 
B. Unconstitutional Practices 
The Supreme Court has also led the federal courts to turn a blind 
eye to racially disproportionate practices in the administration of 
criminal justice, including racial profiling and discriminatory 
sentencing.113 Here, too, state courts should accept the responsibility of 
addressing inequality in their states’ administration of criminal justice 
when legislatures and public opinion are inattentive. 
There have, of course, been important exceptions to the Supreme 
Court’s laissez-faire attitude to state criminal justice. Prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,114 many states had 
undertaken to appoint counsel to indigent defendants facing a felony 
charge, but a number of other states, including Florida, had not. In 
Gideon, the Court found that the Sixth Amendment requires the state to 
provide an attorney for indigent felony defendants as a matter of 
fundamental fairness. Gideon’s mandate was subsequently expanded to 
apply to misdemeanor prosecutions resulting in incarceration.115 
 
 112 Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is this Right Different from 
All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781 (1994). 
 113 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (declining to find racial 
disparities in imposition of Georgia death penalty to constitute a denial of equal 
protection of the law). 
 114 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (finding that Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, including a right to assigned counsel for the indigent, applies to 
state as well as federal felony prosecutions). 
 115 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 
(1979) (finding that assigned counsel is required in cases where sentence of 
incarceration is imposed).  
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The rule in Gideon was clear and not at all unpopular.116 But in 
many states, the political will still does not seem to exist to allocate 
adequate funds for the criminal defense function. Inadequate support for 
defense counsel is a critical problem, as approximately eighty percent of 
criminal defendants cannot afford to hire defense attorneys.117 
In the half century since Gideon, litigation has been necessary in 
more than a dozen states to enforce the states’ obligation to provide 
minimally adequate counsel to indigent defendants.118 Without adequate 
financial resources, public defenders and court-appointed attorneys 
stagger under unreasonable caseloads, cannot engage appropriate 
experts, and sometimes cannot make a living.119 State spending on 
prosecutions has frequently dramatically outpaced expenditures on 
required defense attorneys.120 Louisiana, for example, was forty-third in 
per capita defense funding while it was the number one incarcerator in 
 
 116 See Yale Kamisar, The Gideon Case 25 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/16/opinion/the-gideon-case-25-years-
later.html (observing that the Gideon decision was one of the most popular 
decisions handed down by the Supreme Court).  
 117 Michael W. Macleod-Ball & Kanya Bennett, ACLU Letter to SJC re: Indigent 
Defense Hearing, ACLU (May 23, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-letter-
sjc-re-indigent-defense-hearing. 
 118 See Vidhya Reddy, Indigent Defense Reform: The Role of Systemic Litigation in 
Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel 38–54 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 1279185, 2008), 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/resources/caseStudy_VidhyaKReddy_1224
854933.pdf; see also Darryl Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. 
REV. 907, 910–11, 911 n.18 (2010) (listing litigation in fifteen states: Alabama, 
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and 
West Virginia). 
 119 See Oliver Laughlan, Justice Denied: The Human Toll of America’s Public 
Defender Crisis, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/sep/07/public-defender-us-criminal-justice-system. 
 120 See Emily Badger, The Meteoric, Costly and Unprecedented Rise of 
Incarceration in America, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/04/30/the-meteoric-costly-
and-unprecedented-rise-of-incarceration-in-america/?utm_term=.a9fd1af7e720 
(discussing how state spending on incarceration has outpaced all other state 
spending except Medicaid); see also Erinn Herberman & Tracey Kyckelhahn, State 
Government Indigent Defense Expenditures, FY 2008–2012 –Updated, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS (July 2014), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sgide0812.pdf.   
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the country.121 Oklahoma, when it was the fourth highest incarcerator, 
was thirty-eighth in criminal defense expenditures.122 Some states have 
tried to fix the problem of lack of parity through legislation. For 
example, some statutes require that prosecutors and court-appointed 
defense attorneys be paid comparable salaries.123 
But even these efforts have not always been successful in 
achieving parity. While incarceration policy is generally set at the state 
level, almost half the states require local governments to bear the 
responsibility of funding indigent defense.124 This causes spending 
disparities within states and sometimes leaves impoverished state 
subdivisions in a financially impossible situation. Congress was asked to 
address this multi-state problem through federal legislation in 2015, but 
nothing came of the proposed legislation.125 
The ACLU and its affiliates have been involved in dozens of 
time-consuming, resource-draining lawsuits trying to compel states or 
their subdivisions to provide adequate levels of defense funding.126 In 
 
 121 See Brown, supra note 114, at 919–20. These stark numbers can be somewhat 
misleading, as many other variables other than funding can affect the adequacy of 
defense counsel, but the disparity is nevertheless significant. 
 122 Id. at 920; see also Ryan Gentzler, Cuts to Indigent Defense System Have Left 
Our Justice System Deeply Unbalanced, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (May 3, 2016), 
https://okpolicy.org/cuts-indigent-defense-system-left-justice-system-deeply-
unbalanced/ (discussing how funding for indigent defense in Oklahoma has 
remained flat for fifteen years).  
 123 See, e.g., Marta Mudri, Judicial Impact Statement: Indigent Defense, OHIO 
JUDICIAL CONF. 3 (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://www.ohiojudges.org/Document.ashx?DocGuid=c3cf7170-a70b-4738-8395-
1397c9bc3901. 
 124 See Tanya Greene, (Zealous, Properly-Resourced Defense) Lawyers for All!, 
ACLU (Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/zealous-
properly-resourced-defense-lawyers-all; see also Sarah Breitenbach, Right to an 
Attorney? Not Always in Some States, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Apr. 11, 2016), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/04/11/right-to-an-attorney-not-always-in-some-states.  
 125 See Carl Hulse, Why the Senate Couldn’t Pass a Crime Bill that Both Parties 
Backed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/senate-dysfunction-blocks-
bipartisan-criminal-justice-overhaul.html.  
 126 See, e.g,  Flora v. City of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2015) (alleging gross 
and chronic underfunding of Pennsylvania county public defender’s office); 
Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), rehearing denied, 896 F.2d 479 
(11th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 495 US 957 (1990) (first case to allow 
certification of a class challenging inadequacy of indigent defense funding, in 
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some cases litigation has led to a settlement; in others, federal courts 
have had to impose solutions. Only occasionally are state courts willing 
to play a role in ensuring that the state’s obligation is met. For example, 
in a groundbreaking 1993 case, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that 
the state’s indigent defense funding practices violated the Louisiana 
state constitution.127 Here too, it would be a welcome development for 
state courts to undertake greater responsibility and ensure that their 
states are complying with Gideon, as well as other elements of fair 
criminal procedure. The courts can be part of a dialogue inspiring 
policymakers to rethink their practices. As one litigator commented 
about an indigent defense funding lawsuit, “the constant pressure of the 
lawsuit itself, as well as the chance that the judiciary might fashion a 
remedy, helped legislators understand the value of designing their own 
reform template.”128 
 
Georgia); Class Action Complaint at 3–4, 14, Burks, et al. v. Scott City, 
Mississippi, 3:2014cv00745 (S.D. Miss. 2017) (describing how people who 
couldn’t afford bail were routinely held in jail for as long as a year without 
appointed counsel or an indictment); Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 
1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (finding that public defense system of Mt. Vernon and 
Burlington deprived indigent persons facing misdemeanor charges of their 
fundamental right to assistance of counsel); ACLU, ACLU of Utah and Holland & 
Hart LLP Announce Lawsuit Against State of Utah Over Indigent Defense (June 21, 
2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-utah-and-holland-hart-llp-announce-
lawsuit-against-state-utah-over-indigent-defense; ACLU, Federal Court Finds 
Public Defense System Violates Constitutional Rights of Indigent Defendants (Dec. 
5, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/news/federal-court-finds-public-defense-system-
violates-constitutional-rights-indigent-defendants (towns in Washington state); 
ACLU, ACLU Hails Montana’s Public Defense Bill as Leading National Trend 
(June 8, 2005), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-hails-montanas-public-defense-bill-
leading-national-trend (describing settlement in wake of class action lawsuit) 
(2005); Tanya Greene, Victory! Michigan Turns the Corner on Public Defense 
Reform, ACLU (July 1, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-
reform/victory-michigan-turns-corner-public-defense-reform; Simon McCormack, 
Long-Awaited Public Defense Reform Comes to New York State, ACLU (May 9, 
2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/smart-justice/long-awaited-
public-defense-reform-comes-new-york-state (settlement of Hurrell-Harring v. 
State, 15 N.Y.3d 8 (2010), challenging New York’s public defense system for 
failure to provide adequate funding, resources, and oversight to the public defense 
system). 
 127 State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 783 (La. 1993). 
 128 Greene, supra note 124. 
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Litigation can be an essential lever for affecting change in other 
areas, as well. The new model practices in Biloxi, Mississippi, as one 
example,129 started with a lawsuit—which was then settled through 
institution of a set of reforms that might not have been politically 
feasible without the pendency of a lawsuit. 
On the whole, while the federal courts do have a significant role 
to play on some issues, it is clearly too much to expect that they will 
lead the way to the ideal criminal justice system of the future. The state 
courts may be another matter, at least in some states. Reformers need to 
evaluate choice of courts state-by-state and, ideally, develop a 
coordinated approach to prioritizing which state courts should be asked 
to be the first domino. 
IV. THE POPULAR PARTICIPATION MODEL 
Policy reform on issues like criminalization and sentencing 
ranges can control the overall size of the pipeline into prison. But it does 
not address problems and disparities in the administration of criminal 
justice, which can distort the size and demographics of the prison 
population. Once criminal law has been adopted at the appropriate level, 
it must be applied by police, prosecutors, judges, and other executive 
agencies (including parole boards), all of which are afforded 
considerable discretion. At each of these phases, discretion provides 
opportunities to expand or reduce the number of people in the pipeline, 
as well as opportunities to propagate or reduce discrimination. 
Police discretion determines how many people are arrested. Law 
enforcement agencies, by changing their arrest practices, could 
significantly reduce the size of the pipeline to prison. In his provocative 
recent book, Alex Vitale suggests that we need to fundamentally 
reexamine our ideas about the nature and goals of policing itself,130 
going beyond a focus on whether a particular jurisdiction’s policing is 
arbitrary or discriminatory in practice. In Vitale’s view, it is not a matter 
of accident but of design that policing as an institution reinforces race 
and class inequalities.131 Might increasingly informed public opinion 
create the conditions for a serious reexamination of not only arrest but of 
policing practices in some number of localities? 
Police discretion also determines which particular people will be 
 
 129 See supra, text accompanying notes 99–106. 
 130 ALEX VITALE, THE END OF POLICING (2017). 
 131 Id. at 28–30. 
34
Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjcl/vol23/iss1/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z389882N0J
HERMAN SPRING 2018 
66 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 23:1 
arrested and placed on the path to prison. We know with all too much 
certainty that police discretion is, to varying extents, applied in a racially 
discriminatory manner.132 A wide variety of approaches to controlling 
abuse or bias in policing has been attempted or suggested, ranging from 
reforming overbroad stop and frisk policies,133 to focusing on 
community policing,134 to diversifying law enforcement personnel.135 
For decades, experts have argued about the extent to which the public 
should play a direct role in holding law enforcement accountable 
through civilian complaint review boards.136 Contemporary scholars 
argue that the people also have a powerful informal role to play in 
monitoring police conduct through community “copwatching.”137 
 
 132 See, e.g., ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE (2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/report/report-war-marijuana-black-and-white (stating that, 
nationally, black people are 3.73 times as likely to be arrested for the same 
marijuana offense as white people, despite roughly equal marijuana use); PFAFF, 
supra note 9, at 45–49.  
 133 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 134 See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, ABOUT COPS, 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/about (explaining that the Department of Justice has created 
its own community policing initiative, COPS, to promote community policing 
practices nationwide); see also Charlie Beck and Connie Rice, How Community 
Policing Can Work, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/opinion/how-community-policing-can-
work.html. 
 135 Jen Fifield, Can Diverse Police Departments Ease Community Tension?, PBS 
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/can-diverse-police-
departments-ease-community-tension; see also WOMEN IN FEDERAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, Transforming Law Enforcement by Changing the Face of Policing 
(Sept. 2016), 
http://www.wifle.org/pdf/TransformLawEnforcementbyChangingFaceofPolicing-
WIFLEFinal9272016.pdf. 
 136 See James R. Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, LAW 
AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS (1971), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3349&context=lcp 
(explaining the need for and potential problems with police review boards after 
they were first established in New York City and Philadelphia); see also Peter Finn, 
Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 
(Mar. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184430.pdf (exploring the pros 
and cons of various types of police oversights systems); Priyanka Boghani, Is 
Civilian Oversight the Answer to Distrust of Police?, FRONTLINE (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/is-civilian-oversight-the-answer-to-
distrust-of-police/ (discussing the need for more police oversight boards in the 
aftermath of multiple police-involved shootings).  
 137 See Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (2016) (discussing 
community observation of police). 
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Of the many important questions concerning how to achieve 
appropriate oversight and accountability of law enforcement, 
prosecutors, judges, parole boards, etc., the one I want to focus on here 
is popular participation in prosecution and adjudication of crimes. What 
might an educated public accomplish through involvement in the 
criminal justice system going beyond traditional legislative means? 
A. We, the People 
Just as communities can play a role in oversight of the police, 
formally or informally, they can also involve themselves in ameliorating 
the destabilizing impact of bail138 and in observing trials and other 
phases of criminal adjudications.139 People can use these observations as 
a basis for influencing not only policy but personnel: whom to appoint 
or elect to positions like sheriff, prosecutor, judge, or parole board 
member. 
Although not specific to all of these areas, there is strong 
historical precedent for valuing the role of the people in implementing 
criminal justice: the United States Constitution’s provision for 
substantial and direct popular participation in the prosecution and 
adjudication of criminal cases. 
Both Article III and the Sixth Amendment provide that all 
federal criminal trials shall be  
 by jury,140 and the Fifth Amendment provides that no person can be 
“held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”141 The people, through their 
service on grand and petit juries, were intended to serve as one of two 
decision-makers in criminal prosecutions (with judges as the other). As 
with many of the Constitution’s schemes, jury decision-making is a one-
way ratchet: the people have the power to ameliorate the impact of harsh 
legislative or prosecutorial decisions by declining to indict, by acquittal 
on the facts, or even by nullification of the law. The people as jurors do 
not, however, have the power to make the law harsher than 
 
 138 Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585 (2017) (discussing 
community participation in funding bail).   
 139 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (enumerating the right to a speedy and public trial). 
 140 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by jury”); 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed.”). 
 141 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing exceptions for military trials).  
36
Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjcl/vol23/iss1/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z389882N0J
HERMAN SPRING 2018 
68 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 23:1 
policymakers, police, and prosecutors have done. 
Today, of course, jury trials are rare,142 and the Supreme Court 
held long ago that the right to grand jury indictment does not force the 
states to allow democratic participation in indictment decisions.143 Few 
people take part in the criminal justice system in the direct manner the 
Constitution envisioned: by serving as jurors or grand jurors in particular 
cases. 
But the Sixth Amendment right of public participation is not 
moribund. It may be that the mere possibility of facing a jury has an 
impact on prosecutorial decisions, as prosecutors are likely to offer a 
more attractive plea bargain in a case where conviction seems doubtful. 
And because of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, members of 
the public can nevertheless play a significant role in observing trials as 
well as other phases of criminal adjudications, and then seeking 
accountability for conduct of which they disapprove.144 
It is also noteworthy that in the exceptional line of cases where 
the Supreme Court did intervene in sentencing policy decisions, one of 
the Court’s primary rationales was to preserve the power of juries. In 
Apprendi v. New Jersey,145 the Court invalidated a state scheme allowing 
judges to enhance a sentence based on facts found at a sentencing 
hearing rather than at trial. One of the Court’s principal explanations for 
its holding was that the right to trial by jury should be taken to mean that 
the jury must have the opportunity to determine the facts on which 
sentencing will be based.146 Apprendi’s revolutionary holding147 was 
then applied to upend both state148 and federal149 sentencing guidelines 
schemes. 
The Supreme Court Justices could not have been operating on 
 
 142 U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL CASES (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=23 (showing that over ninety-five 
percent of felony convictions are obtained through plea bargains). 
 143 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).  
 144 SUSAN N. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL 18–30 (2006); 
Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 2173 (2014). 
 145 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490–92 (2000). 
 146 Id. at 476–77, 490. See also Scalia, J., concurring, id. at 498–99 (discussing the 
central significance of the right to trial by jury). 
 147 See Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615 (2002). 
 148 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 149 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
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the assumption that jury trials are the norm, but they nevertheless took 
the Constitution’s provision of a role for the people seriously enough to 
be willing to upset legislatively adopted state and federal sentencing 
guidelines schemes. The spirit of the Constitution’s citizen participation 
provisions remains alive, even if the form of participation may have 
changed. 
B. The People’s Lawyer 
One of the most effective ways for members of the public to 
have an impact on the administration of criminal prosecution is to pay 
closer attention to the election of prosecutors. The experience in 
Oklahoma described above shows that prosecutors can develop vested 
interests in how criminal law should be administered, interests not 
always consistent with their constituents’ views.150 
While prosecutorial power can be a problem, it can also be an 
opportunity to reduce the prison population beyond what can be 
accomplished in the legislatures. Prosecutors have a remarkable amount 
of control over the caliber of the pipeline to prison, exercising an 
enormous amount of unchecked discretion in deciding whom to charge 
with what crimes, and what plea bargains to offer.151 This remarkable 
level of unconstrained and unreviewable discretion is exercised behind 
closed doors, with little transparency. This leaves prosecutors free to 
thwart the will of their constituents. John Pfaff reports that during the 
1990s and 2000s, even as both the crime rate and arrest rate fell, the 
number of felony case filings in state court increased because of 
discretionary prosecutorial decisions.152 In states where sentencing 
ranges have been reduced for a particular offense, some prosecutors 
have set out to vitiate reforms by adding a different charge with a longer 
sentencing range.153 
A few states have considered or adopted proposals for statutory 
or other approaches to constrain prosecutorial discretion. New Jersey, 
for example, created plea bargaining guidelines.154 But in most 
 
 150 Supra, text accompanying notes 72–77 (Okla.); see also supra, text 
accompanying note 43 (prosecutors’ disclaimer in Louisiana task force report). 
 151 See PFAFF, supra note 9, at 127–59. 
 152 Id. at 127. 
 153 Id.  
 154 Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Are Prosecutors the Key to Justice Reform?, 
ATLANTIC (May 18, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/are-prosecutors-the-key-to-
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jurisdictions, the legislatures have failed to assert any sort of control 
over their prosecutors.155 
The Supreme Court has not welcomed constitutional challenges 
to prosecutorial abuse of power. In Connick v. Thompson, for example, 
the Supreme Court found that the District Attorney in New Orleans 
could not be held responsible for the misconduct of his employees in 
concealing exculpatory evidence. 156 Litigation may nevertheless be a 
worthwhile strategy for holding prosecutors accountable for misconduct 
in some instances. For example, the ACLU filed a case against current 
New Orleans District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro for repeated attempts to 
coerce unwilling crime victims and prospective witnesses to testify by 
serving them with fake “subpoenas.”157 State courts could and should 
provide more oversight of their prosecutors than the federal courts have 
been willing to consider. But lawsuits against prosecutors are not likely 
to be a sufficient strategy to change a culture. 
A more promising approach is using the electoral process as a 
vehicle for influencing public opinion and prosecutorial conduct. In 
forty-six states, prosecutors are elected, frequently in uncontested 
races.158 Perhaps the best means of ensuring that prosecutors are not 
disregarding the people’s voice is simply to choose prosecutors more 
knowledgeably. 
The ACLU has urged people to become involved with 
prosecutorial elections: to question candidates for prosecutor about their 
positions on criminal justice issues, to ask candidates to commit 
themselves to positions on issues like bail reform, and to campaign for 
candidates whose policies would move the jurisdiction in the desired 
direction. Candidates are likely to respond to public opinion; and public 
opinion will influence the choice of candidates. 
 
justice-reform/483252/ (describing how New Jersey issues plea bargaining 
guidelines to govern prosecutorial decisions). 
 155 See, e.g., Arnold I. Burns, Warren L. Dennis & Amybeth Garcia-Bokor, Curbing 
Prosecutorial Excess: A Job for the Courts & Congress, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. 
DEF. ATT’YS (July 1998), 
https://www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/98jul01.htm. 
 156 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62–63 (2011) (finding prosecutor not 
liable for wrongful conviction). 
 157 Anna Arceneaux, New Orleans District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro Breaks the 
Law to Enforce It. We’re Holding Him Accountable., ACLU (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/smart-justice/new-orleans-district-
attorney-leon-cannizzaro-breaks-law. 
 158 PFAFF, supra note 9, at 128–29; see also Lantigua-Williams, supra note 154.  
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An ACLU coalition tried this approach in Philadelphia, a city 
with a long tradition of electing tough-on-crime officials, from former 
Mayor and Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo to former District 
Attorney Lynne Abraham (who served from 1991 to 2010 and was 
known as “America’s Deadliest DA”).159 For the Democratic primary 
for District Attorney in 2016, a coalition including Philadelphia 
Coalition for a Just District Attorney, Color of Change, Safety and 
Justice PAC, and the Working Families Party encouraged voters to shine 
a spotlight on criminal justice issues. Philadelphia members of the 
ACLU alone knocked on 26,000 doors; fifty-one canvassers who were 
formerly incarcerated were trained to discuss criminal justice issues in a 
non-partisan way; and criminal justice issues played a prominent role in 
election season debates. The candidate who won the primary and then 
election for Philadelphia DA, Larry Krasner, is a civil rights lawyer 
whose platform featured his dedication to ending mass incarceration, a 
platform that resonated with Philadelphia voters. Encouragingly, the 
more Philadelphia voters learned and talked about criminal justice 
issues, the more they wanted a prosecutor who was committed to 
reform. 
The electoral model will not yield uniform solutions around the 
country, only the solutions local public opinion will bear.160 It will 
feature public participation as a desirable element in setting criminal 
justice policy rather than deference to professionals to set and implement 
their own policies out of the public’s view. This approach can be 
extended to other elected officials, including police commissioners, 
judges, and mayors. And a public spotlight on particular issues can 
influence the choice and choices of appointed officials as well. 
CONCLUSION 
In the old Buddhist saying, paths are many. Criminal justice 
reformers indeed have many paths from which to choose. The 
introduction listed seven different parts of the criminal justice system 
where changes in policy or practice could significantly reduce prison 
 
 159 Udi Ofer, Want to Roll Back Trump’s Tough on Crime Playbook? Then We Must 
Elect Candidates Committed to Criminal Justice Reform., ACLU (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/smart-justice/want-roll-back-trumps-
tough-crime-playbook-then-we-must-elect. 
 160 See PFAFF, supra note 9, at 14–15 (discussing checkerboard nature of this kind 
of reform). 
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population.161 Any one of these could be a starting point. Part II gave 
examples of various paths to reform by elected officials in federal, state, 
or local legislatures, as well as administrative or judicial policymakers. 
These efforts were frequently able to succeed where elected officials 
were reassured that their constituents wanted reform. 
But sometimes, as shown by the Oklahoma ballot initiatives and 
the Philadelphia District Attorney race, the people are more reform-
minded than their elected representatives. Where that is true, the 
people’s will should prevail. In the vision of the Constitution, the 
people, acting as jurors and as spectators, have the prerogative to 
ameliorate the harsh impact of criminal law but not to make the law 
harsher. The arc of the Constitution’s criminal justice provisions bends 
toward mercy and the right of all individuals to be treated with dignity. 
The same balance of values should apply where the people seek to 
influence the underlying criminal law itself. If the people in a particular 
jurisdiction prefer to adopt strategies other than extensive deprivations 
of freedom, like drug treatment programs instead of mandatory 
minimum sentences, it is arrogant of legislators to insist on maintaining 
ineffective mass incarceration policies in the name of protecting those 
people. 
But where public opinion lags behind what we know to be smart 
justice, either due to misinformation (like the persistent misperception 
that crime rates are rising) or lack of empathy (like failure to care about 
racially biased policies or practices, or failure to provide adequate 
funding for indigent defense representation), elected officials should not 
take current polls as setting a ceiling for potential reform. The 
encouraging lesson of criminal justice reform efforts to date is that 
education about the realities of the criminal justice system can change 
minds. The true art of politics is knowing when to lead and when to 
follow public opinion. 
 
 
 161 See supra, text accompanying note 1. 
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